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A REVIEW OF DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES USED IN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS

"Greed is good. Greed clarifies, cuts through & captures the essence of the
evolutionary spirit Greed in all its forms—greed for life, for money, for love,
for knowledge—has marked the upward surge for mankind "

Gordon Gekko (Michael Douglas in "Wall Street")1

INTRODUCTION :

Current Activity : Nineteen Ninety Five smashed all records for mergers and

acquisitions at home and abroad. An unprecedented $458 billion in deals were announced by
U.S. companies, up 32% from the old record of $347 billion reached in 1994, according to the
Securities Data Co.

Similarly, deal count, which last year came in with 7,565 announced

transactions, registered a new record as 8,954 transactions were announced in 1995. Globally, a
record $866 billion in transactions were struck, up 51% from the $572 billion announced in

1994. The big highlights were banking, financial services, pharmaceuticals and big transactions

in media and telecommunications. From diaper makers (Kimberly Clark-Scott Paper) and drug
makers (Pharmacia-Upjohn) to software sellers (IBM-Lotus) and cartoon creators (Disney-Cap
Cities), companies across the corporate landscape tied the knot in an effort to cut costs and boost
earnings.

Walter Adams and James W. Brock.

Wall Street.

Dangerous Pursuits : Mergers ans acquisitions in the age of

(New York : Pantheon Books, 1989 ) 162.

Table 1

The Biggest Deals Announced in 1995
= U.S. deals involving change in majority ownership

ACQUISITION

BUYER

TRANSACTION TYPE

VALUE (billions)

=

EDS Shareholders

Electronic Data Systems

Spinoff *

=

Walt Disney

Capital Cities/ABC

Cash and stock acquisition *

18.83

ITT shareholders

ITT

Spinoff

11.60

=

First Bank System

First Interstate

Stock swap *

10.05

=

Chemical Banking

Chase Manhattan

Stock swap *

9.87

Hoechst

Marion Merrell Dow

Cash acquisition

7.12

=

Time Warner

Turner Broadcasting

Stock swap *

6.88

=

Kimberly Clark

Scott Paper

Stock swap

6.79

H

Pharmacia

Upjohn

Stock swap

6.32

First Data

First Financial Management

Stock swap

5.76

=

Seagram

MCA (Matsushita Electric)

Cash acquisition

5.70

=

NBD

First Chicago

Stock swap

5.30

^

Crown Cork

CarnaudMetalbox

Stock swap

5.20

==

First Union

First Fidelity

Stock swap *

5.07

=

Westinghouse

CBS

Cash acquisition

5.04

ii= * Pending

$21.00

** Wells Fargo successfully counterbid and acquired First Interstate for $10.93 billion
Source: Securities Data Co,

In 1995, it was stock and not cash that dominated M&A transactions as a mode offinancing. Nearly 60 % of all companies used stock as an acquisition currency in 1995, up
from earlier years, partly aided by a booming stock market that effectively made purchases cheaper. Besides, companies would not want to leverage themselves up with
borrowed money when stock swaps can be free. This trend was also fueled by a high level of the U.S. stock market's acceptance of stock as a liquid acquisition currency.
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Looking at these mind boggling and record breaking numbers and dollar amounts of the
merger transactions in 1995, one tends to question himself~WHY?

The answer is, 'To

restructure". With the real economic growth hovering between two and three percent, how can
one possibly create that additional value needed for double-digit growth.

In this era of

globalization, for companies to maintain their competitiveness in regional and global markets

within the parameters set by government-negotiated "managed trade agreements", they simply
have to restructure.

A few of the restructuring tools include mergers & acquisitions,

refinancing, management realignment, leveraged buyouts, and employees stock ownership plans.
This thesis is intended to review the empirical data on previous mergers and acquisitions
(involuntary or hostile) while exemplifying the five most targeted industries either in terms of
their total takeover value or their numerical value of the deals struck. These industries include

the commercial banking sector, radio and television broadcasting stations, electric, gas and water

distribution, business services, and investment & commodity firms, and are used to identify a
few successful and unsuccessful defensive strategies while analyzing their underlying
circumstances.

Types of Acquisitions : The term acquisition is used to describe any transaction in
which a buyer acquires all or part of the assets and business or all or part of the stock and other
securities of the seller. Included within this general term are more specific forms of transactions
such as :

(1) Merger : is a combination of two corporations whose boards of directors approve and

recommend the merger to the stockholders who in turn, approve the merger by a required

favorable vote—normally two-thirds. In a merger, one of the two corporations—usually

2Clark etal.

Restructuring Corporate America. (New York : The Dryden Press, 1988) ix.
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the seller—is merged into the other corporation which is referredto as the surviving
corporation.

(2) Consolidation : is similar to a merger in every aspect except that a consolidation causes
both of the corporations to merge into a new corporation referred to as the survivor
corporation.

(3) Asset Acquisition : is an acquisition in which the buyer acquires all or a part of the assets

and businesses of the seller, pursuant to a contract entered into between the buyer and the
seller with the approval of the seller's stockholders.

(4) Stock Acquisition : is an acquisition in which all or a part of the outstanding stock of the
seller is acquired by the buyer from the stockholders of the seller through a direct
contractual relationship between the two parties.

The element of willingness on part of both, the buyer and the seller, distinguishes an acquisition
from a takeover.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE :

The history of merger activity in the United States has been characterized by four great
merger waves with each one being identified with certain characteristics. The first wave which

peaked at the turn of the century (1895-1905) is remembered for creating monopolies. During
this period, a number of major single-industry firms such as U.S. Steel, Dupont and others

evolved following some major changes in the economic infrastructure and production
technologies which helped elevate to a certain extent, the transformation of regional firms into
national firms. The second wave that started in the 1920's (1922-1929), was characterized by
acquisitions of related firms (suppliers, customers, and competitors), but these mergers did not
create monopolies. A large portion of mergers in the 1920's represented product extension

mergers as in the cases of IBM, General Foods, and Allied Chemical, market extension mergers
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in food retailing, department stores, motion picture theaters, and vertical mergers in the mining
and metals industries. The third wave which began in the 50s (1950-1968), and peaked from

1966 through 1968, produced large conglomerate firms that adopted a diversification strategy
into business activities outside their traditional areas of interest. And finally since 1974, the
fourth wave has witnessed the gradual rise in horizontal and vertical megamerger deals between
large firms. Each of these waves with a minor exception to the latter, were all associated with a

period of sustained economic expansion and a long bull market while coming to an end with the
collapse of the bull market. The fourth wave following the oil crises in mid-70's, unlike its

predecessors, has been the most gradual of all four waves, signaling a fundamental change in the

economy and its effects onthe perspectives or attitudes of firms towards acquisitions, particularly
the hostile raids.

The question whether increased merger activity is a good thing for the economy,
however, remains unresolved and unlikely to be resolved by focusing solely on the experience of

the firms involved. A positive view would argue that mergers represent an unambiguously
positive shifting of assets into their best use and provide the best mechanism for ensuring that
managers actinthe shareholders' interest. A more neutral view would bethat the level of merger
activity is just a by-product of this asset shuffling and has no particular externality; it fluctuates
from time to time corresponding to the fluctuations in the number of shares traded. And the

negative view usually downplays the merger frenzy by associating its downside effects on R&D,
labor, and the economy as whole in terms of real output.

Mergers & Acquisitions
Overview ofExternal Growth

Table 2

Firms seeking
Growth

Internally—Expanding Operations
in order to achieve benefits of

t
Externally ~

Diversification

Taking Over
Operations of

Stability
Operating Economies

Another Firm

Profits from TurnArounds
which has the

which requires financing

advantages of

Rapid Expansion

Issuance of

Cash Payment

Immediate Cash Inflows

Stock

Reduction of Risk
Economies

which is influenced by

}
Antitrust Legislation

T

f
Sherman Act

Clayton Act

* Prevents Monopolies
and illegal trade

* Restrains combinations

between competitors

1
Celler-Kefauver Amendment

* Prevents monopolies in
individual markets

* FTC can order divestment
of stock or assets

i

which is enforced by

i

T

J

Antitrust Division of

Federal Trade

Justice Department

Commission
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DETERMINANTS OF MERGERS :

"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that

we expect our dinner, butfrom their regardfor their self-interest."
Adam Smith3

"Economic Motives" : The mostfrequently hypothesized causes of mergers are to bring
about an increase in profits by eitherincreasing the market power of the firm or reducing its costs

or through a combination of both. Mergers can increase a firm's market power in several ways,
depending upon the type of merger involved. The simplest case is undoubtedly the horizontal
merger. A merger between two firms in the same industry that increases the acquiring firm's
market share may allow it to engage more effectively in tacit or explicit collusion with other

firms in the industry and thereby be able to charge a higher price. Horizontal mergers can also

raise barriers to entry if they are coupled with cost reductions, in turn causing an existing or
potential entrant to deter from competing with cost-efficient larger firms.

Vertical &

conglomerate mergers have also been deemed to have anti-competitive effects through backward
integration and reciprocity respectively.

Each form of merger can also be a cause of cost

reductions. When plantor multiplant economies of scale in production exist, a horizontal merger
can be the source of cost reductions for firms of less than minimum efficient size.

Vertical

integrations also reduce production costs when production processes require closely integrated
steps in the production chain or by reducing the transportation costs between steps in the
production chain or by reducing the uncertainties involved in successive stages of production,

3Adams and Brock 163.
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and thereby enhance the firm's efficiency. Besides, all three forms of mergers can be sources of
reduction in various overhead (overlapped) costs of production. Through mergers, efficiencies of
scale & job cuts can be achieved as a result of financial and managerial synergies, in turn

boosting profits even while revenues stay flat. For these very reasons, mergers can help
companies continue to grow, even in a slowing economy.

"Speculative Motives" : A flip side to the above hypothesis is that mergers are in part
or perhaps entirely motivated by speculative or expectational motives. It seems reasonable to
assume that at any given time there will be differences in individual expectations about the future

profit stream of a firm and thus about the present value of that firm's stock. In a period of rising
stock market prices, mergers will take place whenever outsiders gather information about the

firm's prospects that the present holders do not obtain or foresee. The large capital gains that
accompany bull markets can lead to windfall gains for speculators, making them defiant in their

already speculative and high-risk ventures; like investing substantially in what may seem like a
potential takeover target.

"Managerial Motives" : The possibility that mergers may be motivated in part by
managerial efforts to make personal gains from the mergers that are not shared by both sets of

stockholders, leads directly into the broader set of hypotheses falling under the heading of
"managerial theories of the firm". Growth has been central to the corporate culture, since only
through real growth can the economy promise more for the future in return for today's
investment in labor, capital and technology. And acquisitions offer management precisely what
they are looking for : a short cut to demonstrate corporate growth.

maximization does not necessarily imply or result in profit maximization.

However growth

Mergers are an

obvious and quick way to expand a firm's size, and managers who are willing to sacrifice some

profits and the present value of a firm's stock to achieve sales or asset growth may be willing to
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undertake mergers that cannot be explained on other grounds. It can therefore be inferred upon
that managers who pursue sales or growth maximization through acquisitions, are acting in direct

conflict with shareholders' objectives of profit maximization. Besides, the managers of acquiring
firms are betting with other people's money-represented by the value of their company's stockhence, it would not be unreasonable to say that managers of acquiring firms tend to be risk takers

willing to bet against the unfavorable odds of success, to achieve a self-fulfilling prophecy.
MACROEFFECTS OF MERGERS :

Among the most important policy questions related to mergers are those concerned with

their effects on concentration and on competition among other things. Surprisingly, increased
concentration does not necessarily imply a decline in the effectiveness or vigor of competition.

The rise in the level of aggregate or market concentration-the proportion of economic activity
controlled by the largest firms in the economy~in most industrial countries after World War II

also witnessed during the same period, a rise in competition, thanks to the massive liberalization

and declining trade barriers, causing an increase in world trade and foreign investments.

The basic context of corporate development is a profit seeking enterprise where the
maximization of shareholder-wealth is presumed to be the central driving force. However, in the

United States~and, to a greater extent, elsewhere in the world-constituencies other than private
stockholders are becoming an increasingly influential factor in the evaluation of a target :
organized labor, environmental protectionists, and government agencies overseeing antitrust
violations. Organized labor, if not evaluated carefully, could prove fatal for the company in its
post-merger operations. Environmental protection organizations and agencies have also been
growing in importance as a result of increasing societal concerns, and tend to have a considerable

influence in determining regulatory sanctions. In the antitrust area, each merger wave has
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witnessed a new legislative proposal that institutes various barriers or disincentives in an effort to
discourage future consolidations with certain characteristics.

As viewed in the past that Wall Street reacts negatively to R&D expenditures, also

viewed as sunk costs until they are recovered. Therefore, a company, growing and promising as
it may seem in the long run, can be appraised substantially in the short run if its R&D
(overlapped) costs are trimmed through a strategic acquisition.

The bottom line is that

acquisitions are the flesh and blood of "restructuring" that doesn't mix well with the fat created

from "inefficiencies" caused as a result of excessive labor costs, environmental expenses, and

overlapped R&D sunk costs.4

4

Alan J. Auerbach.

Corporate Takeovers : Causes and consequences. (Chicago : The University of

Chicago Press, 1988), 70-93.

Table 3
:

=

~"i

= =

The Top 10 Target Industry Sectors in 1995
1

VALUE (billions)

MARKET SHARE

NO . OF DEALS

$154.87

17.80%

1,154

Radio and Television Broadcasting Stations

61.49

7.10

553

Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution

54.26

6.20

305

Business Services

49.10

5.60

1,816

Drugs

37.21

4.30

311

Telecommunications

35.10

4.00

442

Insurance

33.47

3.80

579

Paper and Allied Products

30.63

3.50

293

Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges

30.63

3.50

1,188

Food and Kindred Products

28.81

3.30

849

Top 10 Sector Totals

$515.57

59.10%

7,490

Industry Totals

$871.10

100.00%

21,698

TARGET INDUSTRY

Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies

•

Source: Securities Data Co.
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As shown in Table 3, 1995's overall merger activity witnessed a distinct concentration
among the top ten targeted industries with respect to their total market value as well as the
volume of deals announced. I will further my research on the identification of successful and

unsuccessful defensive measures by reviewing the empirical data exemplifying these industries.
The target firms in these industries share some of the following characteristics which include :

(1) A low stock price in relation to the replacement cost of assets or their potential earning
power.

(2) A highly liquid balance sheet with large amounts of excess cash, a valuable securities
portfolio, and significant unused debt capacity.

(3) Good cash flow relative to current stock prices.

(4) Subsidiaries or properties which could be sold off without significantly impairing cash
flow.

(5) Relatively small stock holdings under the control of incumbentmanagement.

A combination of these factors makes the target an attractive investment opportunity
while simultaneously facilitating the acquirer's financing. The firm's assets can be used as

collateral for an acquirer's borrowings, and the target's cash flows from operations and
divestitures could be used to repay the loans.
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EVOLUTION OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS :

"They throw cats and dogs together and call them elephants."
.5

Andrew Carnegie

Foreign competition, rising labor costs, and changing product markets have been

reworking the economic landscapes of industrialized nations. Nowhere have such changes been
more apparent than in the United States, where these changes are forcing a continual record-

breaking era of M&A, that has witnessed a rise in hostile takeover attempts (a relatively new
phenomenon in this field). Hostile takeovers are primarily the result of power, whether it is in
terms of actual control, monetary gains, or just for the satisfaction of an individual's ego. It is
true that the number of hostile deals remain relatively small compared to the total number of
transactions.

However, in aggregate dollar terms—and in terms of their social and economic

impact—these hostile deals deserve the utmost priority and attention by a firm's management;
especially for firms in the banking, entertainment, and the utilities industry as these three
industries topped the 1995's most targeted industries' table in terms of their total market value.
TAKEOVER DEFENSES :

The hostile tender offer made directly to a target firm's shareholders, with or without

previous overtures to management, has become an increasingly frequent means of initiating a
corporate combination.

As a result, considerable interest has been aroused in determining

efficient and effective defensive measures to counter these hostile bids.

Arguments from

managerial defensive actions are grounded on the desirability of creating an auction for the

5 Adams and Brock 83
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Opposing

arguments emphasize increased costs of takeovers and the resulting inefficiency in the market
operation for corporate control.

An extreme view would cite that the coerciveness of tender

offers should not be a matter of concern, given that the takeover market is competitive. In either

case, defensive measures have been increasingly adopted by firms of all sizes and especially the
ones falling under the highly targeted industries' category. Some of the defensive measures are
discussed below :

Green Mail : The term, also known as targeted repurchase of stock, refers to the buying
of shares by the target firm from the raider at a significant premium over the current market
price. The funds required pay the raider for the stock repurchase, are obtained by issuance of
new debt securities. However, other shareholders cannot tender their shares and are thus exposed
to the additional risk the firm has undertaken as a result of the debt issue.

To profit from a

greenmail, the raider must hold less than 10% of the outstanding shares of the target firm. The
SEC considers any investor owning more than 10% to be an insider. Also, if the stock is sold in
less than six months, the profits may be forfeited if the shareholders sue.
More so than with other defensive measures, an agency problem surfaces with the
payment of greenmail. In theory, the objective of the firm is to maximize shareholder-wealth.
The managers, acting as agents of the firm's owners (shareholders), are supposed to engage in
activities that are intended to maximize the wealth position of the shareholders. The agency
problem arises when the interests of the shareholders are not coincident with the interests of the
managers. Payment of greenmail to stop a corporate raider can serve the management's interests

with respect to their job safety, monetary compensation, and associated perks, but may or may
not serve the best interests of the shareholders who are not eligible for the premium payment.
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The payment of greenmail is defended on the grounds that the shareholder will be better
off in the long run by getting rid of the raider on the assumption that the raider would harm the
interests of the other stakeholders in the firm. However, empirical data shows that the board of

directors of the target firm that pays greenmail is usually sued by unhappy stockholders on the

grounds of unfairness with respect to premium payments. Cases are frequently dropped if the
firm's stock appreciates after the payment of greenmail or when the firm is acquired by another
bidder for a higher price. Even otherwise, the courts tend to side with the directors as the issue is

"Intent", and it is difficult to prove that the directors have not acted in good faith. However,
starting in mid-80's, many firms began instituting measures to preclude the payment of
greenmail. The provisions include prohibition of stock repurchases at a premium from investors
with ownership of 5% or more of the outstanding stock. In addition, many firms also require that

premiums for stock repurchases be made available to all shareholders.
Golden Parachutes : refer to separate provisions made in the corporate charter for

compensating executives when fired under a change-of-control clause. The provision usually
calls for a lump-sum payment or payment over a specified period at full or partial rates of normal
compensation. This type of severance contract has been increasingly used by the Fortune 500
firms as M&A activity intensified in the 80's, reflecting an increase in one's susceptibility to
hostile takeovers.

The majority view on golden parachutes now is that these control-related contracts
encourage managements to accept a change of control that enhances shareholder gains and
thereby reduces the possibility of a conflict between shareholders and managers in change-ofcontrol situations. This would also restrain managers from undertaking unwanted short term,

high risk defensive measures that are in direct conflict with their long term goal of shareholder
wealth maximization. However, certain extreme cases of golden parachutes have created a stir
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among the public and are often viewed as "rewards for failure". One example of an extreme case
is the golden parachute payment of $23.5 million to six officers of Beatrice Companies in
connection with its leveraged buy-out in 1985.

One of the officers received a $2.7 million

package even though he had been with the company for only 13 months.

Another officer

received a $7 million package after being recalled from retirement only seven months before.
Also in 1985, the chairman of Revlon received a $35 million package consisting of severance pay

and stock options.

Even in these extreme cases, the golden parachutes were small when

compared to the total acquisition prices of $6.2 billion in the Beatrice LBO and $1.74 billion in
the Revlon acquisition respectively. It is estimated that the cost of golden parachutes is less than

one percent of the total cost of a takeover in most cases. For this very reason, golden parachutes
are not considered to be an effective takeover defense.

Poison Puts : Corporate bond quality often deteriorates following the issuer's leveraged

recapitalization, leveraged buyout, or other forms of control change. Since 1986, some new bond
issues have provided their holders with poison put covenants as a protection from the risk of
takeover-related credit deterioration of the issuer. This investor protection device, however, has
often been viewed as an antitakeover mechanism. This view is substantiated by the fact that the

right to put is triggered by a change of control only in the cases of hostile takeovers. This kind
of put may well protect management but not necessarily the bondholders if the eventual
acquisition was a friendly one.
Exercise of the put after an unfriendly takeover can be very costly to the bidder if the

bond prices are selling at a discount.

However, if the situation is reversed, it could be an

ineffective form of defense when the bond prices are already selling at a premium, in turn forcing
the bondholders to lose their premium while not being able to exercise their options.
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Regulatory Defenses : Regulation of securities is closely related to regulation of merger
and acquisitions activity, since takeovers are carried out by means of the securities markets.

Special characteristics of securities which make them vulnerable to being used fraudulently
mandate regulation to increase public confidence in the securities markets. The Securities Act of

1933, following the stock market crash of 1929, called for registration of public offerings of
securities.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established the Securities and Exchange

Commission to regulate securities market practices; it also specified disclosure requirements for
public companies (Section 13) while setting out the procedural requirements for proxy contests.
A number of other securities laws in the late 1930s and 1940s applied to public utilities, bond
indenture trustees, and investment companies.

The Securities Act of 1933 and Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 provided the framework for subsequent regulation. Most of the more
recent legislation in the M&A area with respect to hostile takeovers has also been in the form of
amendments to these two acts. It was not until 1968 that Congress moved to regulate tender
offers. As amended in 1970, the Williams Act requires that anyone who intends to make a tender

offer that would produce personal ownership of more than 5% of the target's outstanding stock,
is required to provide the SEC with a statement (Schedule 130) disclosing the purchaser's
identity, the source and amount of funds for the purchase including details about financing, the
purpose for ownership of the stock, the number of shares owned, and details of any arrangements
the would-be purchaser has made with others with respect to the acquired stock. Further, the

statute requires persons making recommendations to security holders of target firms with regard
to the acceptance of tender offers to file an information statement with the SEC (Schedule 14D).

The Antitrust Pre-merger Notification Act of 1977 provides the Justice Department and

the FTC, which share enforcement responsibility for the Clayton Act, with the authority to
challenge proposed mergers that "may substantially lessen competition" before they are
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completed. The Act requires that certain major acquisitions by tender offer be delayed for a
fifteen-day waiting period to permit the government to examine the antitrust implications of the

proposed acquisition. The waiting period may be extended by the departments for an additional
10 days. The law affects companies of $100 million or more in sales or assets that expect to
merge with companies of $10 million or more in sales or assets.
In addition to federal regulation of M&A activity, a number of states have enacted

legislation to protect corporations headquartered within the state boundaries. Reincorporating in
states that have enacted restrictive takeover statutes may be a useful delaying tactic. Whereas the

Williams Act requires that a tender remain open for a minimum of fifteen days, some states'
statutes may require as much as sixty days. Many of these statutes have been designed to protect

local corporations from outside tender offers, and, thereby, protect incumbent management by
forestalling takeovers. Their constitutionality, however, is being tested in the courts because it is
argued that they are preempted by the Williams Act. The intent of the Williams Act was that
tender offers be settled in the market place. In any event, while the lawyers argue, the target firm

gains time, and if effectively used, could shift the lead in the target's favor.
White Knights : refer to friendly firms or individuals who save the company from a

hostile takeover by acquiring it.

Corporate America's acceptance of "Bigger is Better" is

reflected in its willingness to get bigger at any cost-either by being acquired or through

acquisitions—as they are different sides of the same coin. However, friendly takeovers which
tend to be preferable to the management than its hostile counterparts, come at an opportunity cost
to the target's as well as the knights' shareholders. The target's shareholders lose out on the lost

opportunity to make that extra buck from a potentially higher bid from the hostile acquirer. The
white knight's shareholders lose out on the increased probability of a failure as a result of a non-
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strategic and rushed merger that could have its toll on the post-merger operations of the new
firm.

Poison Pills : refer to the creation of securities by target companies that provide holders

with special rights exercisable only after a certain period following the occurrence of a triggering
event such as a tender offer for control or the accumulation of a specified percentage of target

shares. These rights in essence make it very difficult or expensive for the bidder to acquire
control of the target firm.

These tactics economically "poison" the would-be acquirer if

swallowed.

Poison pills are generally adopted by the board of directors without shareholder approval.
Usually the rights provided by a poison pill plan can be altered quickly by the board or redeemed

by the firm anytime before they become exercisable following the triggering event.

These

provisions force the bidder to negotiate directly with the target's board of directors. Hence, the

proponents argue that poison pills do not prevent all takeovers but they do enhance the target
board's ability to bargain at their terms. However, the opposite view holds that poison pills are

one of the most potent defensive device that entrenches management while negatively affecting
shareholder wealth. There are five main types of poison pills which are summarized as follows :

(a) Preferred Stock Plans : Also referred to as the original plans, these plans have
provisions that give dividends of convertible preferred stock to the holders of common stock and

entitles holders of the preferred stock to one vote-one share and somewhat higher dividends than

ones distributed to holders of the convertible preferred stock. If a trigger point is reached,
preferred stockholders are given priority in redeeming their holdings for cash at the highest price

the largest block holder paid for acquiring the majority stake in the past year, and if the acquiring
party merges with the firm, the preferred stock can be converted into the acquirer's common
stock with a total market value no less than the redemption value in the first case.

SHAH

20

The original plan is thus seen to be designed to deter coercive two-tier tender offers or to
avoid dilution that can be effected by a majority shareholder. A partial tender offer for the
preferred stock is likely to fail because holders of the preferred stock have no incentive to tender
their shares, as they are guaranteed to receive the highest price paid by the bidder. Modified twotier offers may still be possible. For instance, the bidder could buy most of the preferred and half
of the common stock at a lower price through a formal merger transaction.

(b) Flip-Over Rights Plans : have been the most popular poison pill defense since
introduced in late 1984. Under this plan, shareholders receive a common stock dividend in the
form of rights to acquire the firm's common or preferred stock at an exercise price well above the
current market price, and if a merger occurs, the rights "flip over" to permit the holder to
purchase the acquirer's shares at a substantial discount. Note that the flip-over plan does not
prevent an acquirer from obtaining a controlling interest in the target.

However, mergers or

transfers of assets which are the primary goals of most takeovers become prohibitively expensive
unless the acquirer obtains most of the rights, which again would be an expensive course as

holders of these rights tend to hold them for the highest possible return which is usually realized
when the rights are exercised.
(c) Ownership Flip-In Plans : allows holders with rights to purchase target shares at a
large discount if an acquirer accumulates target shares in excess of a threshold or a "kick-in"
point which is generally between 25 and 50 percent. The acquirer's rights are void. Hence, this

provision imposes losses on the acquirer and dilutes the acquirers' majority stockholder's equity
stake. Ownership flip-in plans thus deter acquisitions involving a substantial equity position by
any means and could be made more effective when combined with flip-over provisions.
(d) Back-End Rights Plans : Under these plans, shareholders receive a rights dividend. If

an acquirer obtains shares of the target in excess of a limit, holders excluding the acquirer can
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exchange a right and a share of the stock for senior securities or cash equivalent to a back-end
price set by the target firm's board of directors. The back-end price is higher than the stock's
market value at the time and thus back-end plans set a minimum takeover price for the firm.

Back-end plans deter acquisition of a controlling interest. A conditional tender offer for less than
the back-end price will not succeed because rights have an incentive to hold out for the higher

back-end price. This again promotes the free-rider problem as described in previous poison pill
plans.

(e) Voting Plans : are implemented by declaring a dividend of preferred stock with

voting rights. In some cases, if a party acquires a substantial block of a firm's voting stock,
preferred holders other than the larger block holder become entitled to supervoting privileges. It
is thus difficult for the block holder to obtain voting control. In a different case, long-term (three

or more years) holders of preferred stock are entitled to more votes per share than short-term
holders, making it more difficult for a bidder to acquire voting control rapidly.
In conclusion, all five poison pills share a common characteristic; they promote the free-

rider problem, thereby causing a tender offer conditional on shareholders surrendering their pill
securities to the bidder to fail. Hence, it is not feasible for a hostile bidder to avoid penalties

imposed by these pills.
Leveraged Recapitalizations : This technique of financial restructuring was first

developed by Goldman Sachs for Multimedia in 1985. It is considered to be a defensive tactic
because in most cases the recapitalization, also known as leveraged cash-out (LCO), has been

implemented in response to a hostile bid. In a typical recap, outside shareholders receive a large
one-time cash dividend and insiders (managers) and employee benefit plans receive new shares
instead of the cash dividend. The cash dividend is financed mostly by newly borrowed funds,
both senior bank debt and through mezzanine financing (subordinated debentures). As a result,
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the firm's leverage is increased to an abnormally high level, in turn, cutting off a major source of
acquisition financing for a potential raider, in turn, discouraging leveraged takeovers.
Simultaneously, equity ownership of the management also rises and thereby ensuring the
remaining stakeholders of "true" efforts by the management for the maximization of shareholder
wealth.

In contrast to most other defensive measures, LCO's provide decent returns to

shareholders that are comparable to a takeover. Although the technique has grown in popularity,

leveraged recapitalization carries a great deal of risk. In order to meet its debt obligations, a
highly leveraged company needs stable cash flows, which can be a problem if the economy
experiences a downturn. Strong management with viable and growth oriented strategic plans
with sufficient alternatives as a backup is the key for a recap to succeed in the long run.

Shark Repellents : Precaution is the best form of reaction. Following this principle,
companies, with shareholder approval, are increasingly incorporating antitakeover amendments,

popularly known as shark repellents, in the firm's charter. Failure to pass might be taken as a
vote of no confidence in incumbent management and may provide a platform for a proxy fight or

takeover attempt where none had existed before.

In general, shark repellents impose new

conditions on the transfer of managerial control of the firm through a merger, tender offer, or by

replacement of the board of directors. There are four major types of antitakeover amendments.
(a) SuperMajority Amendments : These amendments require shareholder approval by at
least two thirds vote and sometimes as much as 90% of the voting power of outstanding capital
stock for all transactions involving change of control. However, in most cases, the supermajority
provisions have a board-out clause which provides the board with the flexibility to determine
when and if the provisions would be in effect.
(b) Fair-Price Amendments : These are supermajority provisions with a board-out clause
and an additional clause waiving the supermajority requirement if a fair price is paid for all
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purchased shares. The fair price is commonly defined as the highest price paid by the bidder
during a specified period and is sometimes required to exceed an amount determined relative to
the book value of the target company.

Thus, fair price amendments defend against two-tier

tender offers that are not approved by the target's board. A uniform offer for all shares to be

purchased in a tender offer and in a subsequent clean-up merger or tender offer will avoid the
supermajority requirement. Since the two-tier tender offer is not essential in successful hostile

takeovers, the fair-price amendment is the least restrictive among the class of supermajority
amendments.

(c) Classified Boards : Another major type of antitakeover amendment provides for

"staggered" or "classified" boards of directors to delay the effective transfer of control in a
takeover.

Management's purported rationale in proposing a staggered board is to assure

continuity of policy and experience. For example, a nine member board might be divided into
three classes, with only three members standing for election to a three-year term each year. Thus,

a new majority shareholder would have to wait for at least two annual meetings to gain control of
the board of directors. Effectiveness of cumulative voting is reduced under the classified-board

scheme because a greater shareholder vote is required to elect a single director. Variations on

antitakeover amendments relating to the board of directors include provisions prohibiting the
removal of directors except for cause, and provisions fixing the number of directors allowed to

prevent "packing" the board.
(d) Authorization of Preferred Stock : The board of directors is authorized to create a new
class of securities with special voting rights. This security, typically preferred stock, may be
issued to friendly parties in a control contest. Thus, this device can be classified as a defensive

measure against hostile takeover bids. The new issuance if executed properly, can effectively
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dilute the bidder's equity position while simultaneously tilting the balance of power in favor of
the management.

Other amendments that management may propose as a takeover defense include :

(1) Abolition of cumulative voting where it is not required by state law.
(2) Reincorporating the charter in a state with more accommodating antitakeover laws.
(3) Provisions with respect to the scheduling of shareholder meetings and introduction of
agenda items, including nomination of candidates to the board of directors.

(4) Antigreenmail amendments which restrict a company's freedom to buy back a raider's
shares at a premium.
In response to the rise in hostile takeovers, the use of shark repellents as a defensive

device, has become increasingly frequent regardless of the type of industry or the size of the firm.
Employees Stock Ownership Plans : ESOP is a type of stock bonus plan which invests

primarily in the securities of the sponsoring employer firm. They were established by Congress
in 1974 as a way to encourage employee ownership of corporations while providing attractive
incentives such as tax breaks among other things to the corporations.

ESOPs also offer

corporations a low-cost borrowing alternative where the proceeds are not required to be used
solely for employee benefits. ESOPs also provide corporations with less restrictive and a cost-

effective alternative to pension plans. But most important of all, ESOPs can be used by the

management as a takeover defense against hostile raiders. As discussed earlier, M&A especially
hostile acquisitions usually have negative effects on labor among other stakeholders. Hence,
ESOPs when carefully planned and executed, can be a useful deterrent device against hostile

takeovers.

However, their effectiveness in this regard is still being decided by court

interpretations having to do with the voting rights of unallocated shareholders.
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A Review of TakeOver Defenses Used in Five Industries over the Last Decade :

With the help of my mentor, Dr. D'Mello who has an on-line subscription to the

Securities Data Company's world-wide M&A database, I was able to download a brief synopsis
detailing vital data about companies in the five most targeted industries (see Table 3) and that

have used defensive techniques against hostile raiders since 1985. Surprisingly enough, among
the thousands of mergers that have occurred in the last decade in these five industries alone, I

came up with only 30 deals in which some sort of defensive technique was used against
unsolicited offers. This seems to reflect a structural change in the mind-set of corporate America
in favor of the clause "Bigger is Better". However, as small as the sample may seem, the total
maiket value of these hostile bids amounted to $36.77 billion in these five industries alone-

significant enough to substantiate the purpose of this thesis : to evaluate commonly used
defensive techniques and the extent of their success through the use of empirical data. This

evaluation, however, has its limitations.

To begin with, the sample of the data although

complete, remains a drop in this ocean of mergers. And like any other model or theory, a series
of assumptions accompany this one too. They are :

(1) Size of both firms are assumed to have no impact on the outcome.
(2) The market value of the acquisition and post merger effects are assumed to be constant
with respect to regulatory (antitrust) evaluations.

(3) The three determinants of mergers (discussed earlier) are assumed to be constant for the
sample.

(4) The defensive tactics are evaluated as an independent variable.

Despite the limitation and assumptions stated above, the defensive techniques in various

combinations showed a high rate of success. "Success" refers to the achievement of the end goal
by the target's management : prevention of a hostile takeover by the bidder.

This definition
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includes takeovers by white knights and even subsequent deals with the bidder as long as the
final outcome is "friendly". Anything else falls under the unsuccessful category. Going by these
parameters, 24 bids (80% of the sample) were successfully averted either with external assistant
from a white knight or through lockup agreements that forced friendly outcomes with the

acquirer

or simply because of effective execution of defensive tactics that made the target

unattractive causing the raider to withdraw. One case is still pending as of April 1, 1996, while
the rest of the five cases were forcefully acquired by the bidder. Although small in absolute
terms, hostile takeovers still represent 17% of the total sample and the market value of these
raids, $14.66 billion, amounts to 40% of the total hostile bids.

The most commonly used defensive techniques were white knights, self-tenders, poison
pills with and without flip-over provision, and a combination of asset and stock lockups. These
techniques were either used by themselves or in a combination with other techniques.
following table breaks down the above mentioned techniques :
Times Used

Successful

Unsuccessful

Pending

Self-Tender

6

6

0

White Knight

13

8

4

Poison Pills w/Flip-Over Prov.

5

4

1

Poison Pills w/o Flip-Over Prov.

12

5

1

Lockup (Asset and/or Stock)

3

3

0

The

Table 4

[

Target Namo

Acquiror Nam?

A Breakdown of Cases by the Target's Industry Group
ICJpnsive Tactics
Lockup Description
Hostile Techniques

Business Description

Value (mil)

;;;<|tt^eme

: :*.$|8§|g

Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies

Delta Bank & Trust Co.

Hibemia Corp.

Banking
Banking
Banking
Banking
Banking
Banking
Banking
Banking

Florida Comm. Banks Inc.

Investor

Investment

First Interstate Bancorp.
Irving Bank Corp.
Marine Corp.
Michigan Nat'l Corp.

Wells Fargo & Co.

LSB Bancshares Inc. of SC

BB&T Financial Corp.
Marine Corp.

First Interstate Corp.
Westamerica Bancorp

Bank of New York Co. Inc.

Marshall & llsley Corp.
Comerica Inc.

Bank of the West

Completed
Completed

SS

WK

None

TO, TM, SS

PP, FO-PP, WK

None

$10,929.90
1,377.00

SS

WK

None

597.00

Withdrawn

WS, SS

WS

None

354.90

Withdrawn

SS, Pooling of Interests, Collar

Lockup, SL

Option-771,894@$30/sh

122.80

Completed Friendly

WS, SS

WS

None

111.00

Withdrawn

Going Private

PP, FO-PP
PP, WK

None

100.00

Withdrawn

None

30.00

WK

None

19.00

TO

166
462

204

Pending
Acquired by WK

42

91

$13,641.60
Business Services

Midcon Corp.
Midcon Corp.
Manpower Inc.
Gelco Corp.
Intelogic Trace Inc
Recognition Equip. Inc.
Triad Systems Corp.
MSI Data Corp.
High Voltage Eng. Corp.
Philip Crosby Assoc. Inc.
Isomedix Inc.

Occidental Petroleum Corp.

Oil & Gas; Petr. Refining
Oil & Gas; Petr. Refining

WK, TO, TM, T-TO, SS

Lockup, AL, SL

Option-asset & 7.5 mil. shs

3,065.50

Completed Friendly

Going Private, TO, TM

ST, SS, WK

None

Withdrawn

Blue Arrow PLC

Business Services

TO, TM

WK

None

2,539.80
1,327.60

Coniston Partners

Investment & Comm. Frm

TO, TM, Going Private

ST, Law, FO-PP

None

325.40

Withdrawn

TRW Inc.

Electronic & Elect. Equip

ST

None

177.00

Withdrawn

Prospect Group Inc.

Food & Kindred Products

PP

None

153.90

Withdrawn

Volt Info Sciences Inc.

Machinery
Computer & Office Equip

LB, OMO, TO, TM, T-TO, MBO
TO, TM
TO.TM

None

141.90

Withdrawn

None

108.00

None

90.00

Option-1,283,070 @$9.5/sh

61.30

Acquired by WK
Completed
Completed Friendly

None

37.00

Withdrawn

WB Partners

Investment & Comm. Frm

TO, TM, Going Private

PP, FO-PP
PP, WK
WK, Law

Alexander Proudfoot Wwide

Business Services

TO, TM

Lockup, SL

Radiation Sterilizers Inc.

Health Services

Going Private, TO, TM

PP, FO-PP, Gold Par.

Telxon Corp.
Hyde Park Partners LP

Completed

43

524
84

$8,027.40

Radio and Television Broadcasting
CBS Inc.

Turner Broadcasting

Entertainment

LIN Broadcasting

McCaw Cellular Comm. Inc.

Telecommunications

John Blair & Co.

MacFadden Holdings Inc.
Investor Group

Storer Communications Inc.

Printing & Publ. Serv.

TO, WS, SS
TO, TM
PF, TO, TM, T-TO, GP

Investment & Comm. Frm

Proxy Fight

ST.WS

None

None

5,455.00
5,080.00

Withdrawn

PP

WK

None

362.00

Withdrawn

ST.WK

None

Withdrawn
Withdrawn

$10,897.00

Investment and Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges
Income Opportunity Realty
Cypress Fund Inc.
Jefferies Group Inc.

DRF Acquisition Corp.

Investment & Comm. Frm

Going Private, TO, TM

PP

None

26.50

NAV Partners LP

Investment & Comm. Frm

OMO, TO

ST, Proxy Fight

None

23.50

Undisclosed Acquiror

Unknown

PP, ESOP

None

Withdrawn
Withdrawn
Withdrawn

$50.00

Electric, Gas and Water Distribution
Texas Eastern Corp.
Magma Power Co.
Kansas Gas & Electric

Coastal Corp.
California Energy Co.
Kansas City Power & Light Co.

Utilities
Utilities
Utilities

TO, TM
TO, TM, T-TO

PP.WK

None

2,340.00

PP

None

Proxy Fight, TO, TM

WK

None

937.70
876.00
$4,153.70

SS=Stock swap; TO=Tender offer; TM=Tender/Merger; WS=White Squire; WK=White knight; T-TO=Two-tier offer; LB=Leveraged Buyout; OMO=Open market operation ; MBO=Management Buyout
PP=Poison Pills; FO-PP=Poison pills w/flip-over prov.; ST=Self-tender

Withdrawn

Completed
Acquired by WK

158

Table 5

Self-Tender

White Knight

Poison Pills w/Flip-Over Prov.
Poison Pills w/o Flip-Over Prov.
Lockup (Asset and/or Stock)

# of Times Used

Successful

Successful w/(C)

Successful (C\ Used

Unsuccessful

Unsuccessful w/(C)

Unsuccessful (C) Used

6

6

5

WK, SS, PF, FO-PP

13*

8

6

PP, ST, SS

4

2

PP, FO-PP, LAW

5

4

4

PP, ST, LAW, GoLP

1

1

PP, WK

12*

9

6

WK, FO-PP, ESOP, GoLP

2

1

FO-PP, WK
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3
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Table 7

Comparison in Absolute Terms

10.00

9.00

8.00

7.00

• Self-Tender (6)
• White Knight (13)*
• Poison Pills w/Flip-Over Prov. (5)

6.00
03
CD

• Poison Pills w/o Flip-Over Prov. (12)

Q

• Lockup (Asset and/or Stock) (3)
5.00
CO
a

E
3

4.00

3.00

2.00

1.00

0.00
Successful

Successful w/(C)

Unsuccessful

Unsuccessful w/(C)
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CONSOLIDATION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY :

A hostile market or industry is one in which too many competitors are pursuing too little
customer volume. And when demand declines, hostility begins. But when hostility continues
through the recession and into the expansion phase, the cause then, is increased competition. The

problem, then, is too many players. And, the banking industry is witnessing precisely that—too
many players for too little a market. The banking industry is consolidating at an unprecedented
pace. 1995 was a year of megadeals, especially for the banking industry. Record breaking 400
bank deals, worth $58 billion, were announced last year while world-wide consolidations
amounted to $154 billion. In contrast to the 80's, when consolidation resulted primarily from
bank failures, the 90s' shrinkage in the banking industry is more often associated with

competitive factors as a result of globalization and the changing regulatory environment. In fact,
competition in the banking industry has never been more intense. For e.g. Blue-chip companies
which were once banks' traditional clients, can now easily obtain financing through the securities
market.

And middle-market businesses can turn to finance companies, such as GECC for

favorable terms and credits that are subject to far fewer regulations. And retail customers too,

may choose from a wide range of nonbank financial institutions that can deliver almost any
financial product available in the market without establishing branches, in tum being able to
provide services at competitive rates. To meet these competitive challenges, "cost containment"

and "efficiency" have become the watch words of the banking industry. And one of the best
ways to achieve these goals is by increasing the client base through diversification of financial
products without significantly increasing overhead.

Banking is a mature industry with an antiquated distribution system and no proprietary

products. The only alternative left to achieve and sustain economies of scale is for the industry
to rationalize, with banks becoming fewer in number and larger in size. And acquisitions offer
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the banking industry precisely that, creating an effective synergy between two banks. Mergers
and acquisitions have become an industry-wide response to competitive threats. In 1975, there
were 14,000 U.S. commercial banks. By the end of 1994, the number of banks had shrinked to

10,592 and is expected to consolidate till it hits the equilibrium of around 5,000 banks.6
First Interstate v/s Wells Fargo :

On October 18, 1995, Wells Fargo and Company, a west coast behemoth in the banking
industry, launched an unsolicited offer to acquire First Interstate Bancorp based in Los Angeles,
CA. Wells used stock swap as the form of acquiring which was countered with the use of a

white knight (First Bank System) as a defensive tactic by First Interstate.

This friendly

agreement between First Bank which is based in Minneapolis—a deal that looked competitive in
the early stages-was favored heavily by the target's stakeholders including Califomia's

legislative authorities, its labor union and the community in general as this merger was perceived
to have fewer downsizing effects as a result of minimal overlapping (of market share). However,
it became increasingly difficult for First Interstate to convince its shareholders that a First Bank's

union was in their best interest as Wells' bid increased by approximately $1 billion.

In

comparison, Wells' offer grew to dwarf First Bank's by almost $1.5 billion over the course.

Besides, First Bank received a major blow when SEC ruled that First Bank must suspend its

stock buyback plan, a key element in its financing, for two years instead of the expected 90 days.
With these factors combined, Wells Fargo and Company was eventually successful in acquiring
First Interstate Bancorp for $10.93 billion. First Bank System also profited from this experience
as it pocketed away $200 million in breakup fees.

As concluded later, and now substantiated by this example, white knights by themselves
do not prove to be an effective form of defense. There are two main reasons which tend to affect

, Hazel J. Johnson,

Bank Mergers. Acquisitions. & Strategic Alliances : positioning & protecting your

bank in the era of consolidation.,

f New York : Praeger Publishers 1995 ), 1.
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this conclusion. As cited earlier, the change in the mindset of corporate America in response to
globalization has had an aggregate effect on the economy forcing a structural change on the
aggregate level. With respect to M&A's, this reflects a major shift in the intention of corporate
raiders : To acquire targets for strategic purposes and not for short-term gains. Given these new
parameters, a typical raider these days does not think twice to increase the takeover bids

repeatedly, as long as the mission is completed. Secondly, white knights, the friendly acquirer,
comes at an opportunity cost to the target's shareholders : Lost spread from a potentially higher
takeover premium.

With these factors combined, I came to the conclusion that white knights by themselves
fail to guard the target from hostile raids. However, my evidence does indicate the high success
rate of white knights when used in a combination with other defensive measures such as

"discriminatory" poison pills (w/o flip over provision). Antitakeover amendments, popularly
known as shark repellents, along with legal defenses when combined with white knights, also
prove to be effective.
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CONCLUSION:

Empirical evidence indicates that the "discriminatory" poison pills, some defensive
adjustments in asset and ownership structure through charter amendments, and targeted share
repurchases have negative effects on stock prices but they reduce the success rate of takeover
bids. These measures are sufficient by themselves but work better when used in combinations.

Negative effects do not appear to be limited to those defensive measures that do not require
shareholder approval. White knights when used in a combination with poison pills and selftenders, proved to be highly effective. However, that comes at a cost to the shareholders-almost

all cases showed the target management having had to settle for a lower bid. While self-tenders

from my sample data generated a 100% success rate, they were used by themselves and in

combination with proxy fights, legal defenses, and pills.

Self-tenders are great for the

shareholders who tendered their shares, but could adversely hit the remaining shareholders if the
company fails to make up for the lost spread through its future earnings. Unlike most defensive

actions taken in reaction to explicit takeover attempts, leveraged cash-outs do not negatively
affect shareholder-wealth as the recap is always undertaken at a substantial premium over the
stock's market value.

Nondiscriminatory poison pills (mostly flip-over plans) and other types of antitakeover

amendments including antigreenmail amendments, golden parachutes and poison puts do not
show clearly, the negative effects on stock prices. However, this does not necessarily imply that
they are not harmful to shareholders because they may signal an increased likelihood of a

takeover bid as they may not be viewed as an effective defense by the market. Legal aid by itself
does not provide good defense except in cases of outright antitrust violations (Microsoft-Intuit)
which however, are rare to begin with. Litigation by targets are intended to increase the takeover

premium or gain some time through its delaying effect to prepare for a planned defense.
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FINAL SCORE :

"Speculation in things already produced—that is not business. It is just more
or less respectable graft."
Henry Ford

What is the ultimate end of the game? Money. More money. And still more. The
ultimate objective is not to win this takeover or that merger; it is to make money on the outcome.

"Winning" control of this corporation or "losing" control of it to someone else is, in the larger
scheme of things, essentially irrelevant. In the final analysis it is the monetary tally that matters.

A raider can win by losing if he buys stock in the target firm early and at a lower price, and sells
out later at a substantially higher price. He can get "greenmail" just for agreeing to desist from

further attacks on a target company. A corporate acquirer can be "defeated" by a white knight,
and fail to gain control of a targeted victim, but win by making millions on the sale of the
target's stock it had already acquired. Management can lose control if an outside raid succeeds,
but win from golden parachutes that trigger multimillion-dollar severance bonuses, lifetime
salaries, and even home mortgage buybacks.

The point of the game is profit. But as befits so bizarre a game, it is a peculiar kind of

profit : profit without production. The game is played not to enhance manufacturing efficiency
and productivity, not for research, development, and technological innovation, not to expand jobs

for workers and raise the national standard of living, but in order to make profit for the players.
Profit from intrigue. Profit from cunning and financial chicanery. Profit from threat, bluff, and

Adams and Brock 167.
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counterattack. Profit form shuffling paper ownership shares. But above all else, profit without
the burden of producing durable, tangible, real economic wealth. And all this is being done in
the name of achieving "economies ofscale".
PRECAUTIONS :

Understand the Environment: Threat is the key to being prepared. If you don't know
who might be aiming for an attack on your company when, your chances of survival—no matter

what the merits of deal—are slim. Obvious place to watch : companies that need what you have

and have the resources to do so. For e.g. IBM was looking to strengthen its software strategy; its
unsolicited offer for Lotus shouldn't have been surprising. Another important source of danger

that most executives overlook are the annual reports of companies being priced in foreign
currencies.

Hence, even where a U.S. company looks fairly priced compared with domestic

competitors, it may look cheaper in marks or yen.

Beat the Raider at his own Game : When a manager gets serious about making his

company takeover-proof, he usually starts assessing his company the way a potential acquirer
would.

This involves benchmarking oneself on certain important financial measures such as

stock market valuation, margins, and returns on capital relative to the industry average. For e.g.
How would a buyer run your enterprise with more leverage? Which banks are likely to back a
hostile bidder and at what rates and terms of financing? What return on equity could the raider

reasonably expect? And finally, is the current market value of your stock fairly priced? If the

analysis concludes that the stock is underpriced, try boosting its value. This can be done by
changing R&D spending policies, capital expenditure program, and restructuring employee plans

and other labor related plans. Wall Street usually reacts quickly and favorably to these changes.
But be careful not to shoot yourself through suicidal defensive measures just because you think
someone else is about to shoot you.

SHAH

37

Look Smart : Don't underestimate the importance of communicating often and openly

with Wall Street.

If analysts believe your company won't disappoint them with quarterly

earnings surprises or major strategic initiatives, the stock will tend to remain fairly priced, thus
eliminating the undervaluation factor in hostile bids. When it comes to corporate control, a
leader's image in the press is an important reality and can play a crucial role in crises.

Spruce up the Bylaws : Despite all these preparations, one could still end up a target at
an unfair price.

Many executive teams, for example, fail to consider how their corporate

governance mechanisms will work under the heat of a hostile bid.

"Recapping" corporate

charters as mentioned earlier in the paper, along with a combination of other defensive measures,
can strengthen the company's defense, necessary to bargain a fair price or refute the offer
completely.

SHAH

38

SUMMARY :

The key is in being proactive and not reactive.

Companies should consider the

following, in addition to their normal defensive planning :
Vulnerability to a proxy contest for seats on or control of the Board :

(1) Assure that staggered board mechanisms work and that certificate of incorporation and

bylaw provisions dealing with the board of directors, cumulative voting and "lock-in" of
these types of provisions would discourage unsolicited efforts to take control of the
board.

Procedural control to conduct special shareholder meetings :

(1) Bylaws concerning the notice and voting requirements for shareholder meetings and

voting by consent should effectively preclude shareholders from harassing the company
by calling for a series of shareholder meetings to vote on disruptive shareholder
proposals.

(2) Understand the limitations that the company may impose on shareholderproposals
sought to be included within the company's proxy statement.
Constantly oversee shareholder purchases and turnovers:

(1) This would help identify shareholders most likely to challenge the management and the
Board through their trading patterns.

(2) Track trading in high volume periods and stay in close contact with investment bankers
and proxy solicitors who can find out "what is really going on".

(3) Know the background and history of individuals, entities and groups who make large
purchases of your securities.

(4) Train investor relations personnel to report unusual or "revealing" shareholderinquiries
to management.
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(5) Compare trading volume with analysts' reports.
(6) Evaluate trading patterns subsequent to purchase and sale filings by insiders.
(7) Be aware of arbs and investor groups that are known for "making things happen".
Be familiar with Board appointees :

(1) Do background checks on prospective directors to determine their experience,
involvement, and/or propensity to agitate for short-term maximization of shareholder
value.

(2) Beware of investors and shareholder groups which demand representation on the Board
of Directors.

(3) Consider when it does make sense to put an investor representative on the Board.

Understand and appreciate how the company is viewed by investors :
(1) Can the company's value be enhanced if divisions are sold separately ?
(2) How does deregulation and globalization affect the merger frenzy in your industry ?
(3) Know on what basis is the company's stock being marketed by the brokers.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS%

Bear Hug : An unnegotiated letter offer, made directly to the target company's board of
directors, that isn't very attractive but attractive enough to cause shareholder protests if
the board refuses.

Black Knight: A party that makes a takeover offer that's hostile to the company's
present management.

Creeping Takeover : A takeover by an acquirer that gradually buys enough open-market
stock to control the firm.

Crown Jewel Option : Selling or optioning a firm's best assets to a third party to make
itself a less attractive target.

Drop-Dead Fee : A fee paid to lenders by potential acquirers when the proposal fails and
lines of credit to finance the acquisition aren't used.

Flip-Over Provision : A provision added to the charter of a target company allowingthe
conversion of preferred shares into common stock of the target company or
acquiring company. This makes the takeover less attractive because it increases

the number of shares that have to be bought.

Freeze-Out: Pressure on remaining minority stockholders to rum over their stock after a new
owner has gained control of the company.

Godfather Offer : A tender offer so generous that management of the target company
isn't in a position to refuse it.

"The black knight meets the killer bees - A glossary of terms,"
88.

Personnel Journal. 72, June 1993
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Golden Handcuffs : An employment agreement that makes it very costly for senior
managers to leave the company.

Golden Parachute : Generous termination benefits approvedfor senior executives when
someone else buys control of the company.

Gray Knight: A potential acquirer whose intentions aren't known; usually a third party
that makes an offer to purchase a target after a black or white knight or both
have done so.

Greenmail: The premium paid by the target to buy back its shares from a potential
acquirer so that the acquirer will abandon the takeover attempt.
Jonestown Defense : Defensive tactics so extreme as to seem suicidal.

Junk Bond : A high-yield, high-risk debt often used to finance takeovers.

Killer Bees : A team of lawyers, bankers, and proxy solicitors kept on retainer by a
company in case they are needed to fight a takeover.

Lady Macbeth Strategy : A tactic in which a third party appears to be a white knight but then
changes and supports the hostile acquirer.

LBO : Taking control of a company using a high degree of debt in relation to equity. It
stands for leveraged buyout offer.

Lockup Agreement: An agreement between the target company and the acquirer that
makes the target very unattractive to any other acquirer.

Lollipop Tactic : Stopping a hostile takeover by allowing shareholdersto tender their
shares at a premium price if an unfriendly bidder buys a certain number of shares.

MBO : The purchase of a firm by its management (management buyout).
Mezzanine Financing : Intermediate-term LBO funding (two to ten years); investorsoften

SHAH

receive equity in the form of stock options, warrants or convertible debentures as
part of the deal.

Nibble Strategy : The purchase of a minority stock position in the target company
followed by a tender offer for the remaining stock.

Pac-Man Defense : A tactic in which the target company tries to purchase control ofthe
hostile acquirer before the hostile acquirer gains control of it.

Poison Pill: A tactic used by the target company to make the takeover expensive, such as
issuing to common shareholders new preferred stock that they can profitably convert
into common shares during a takeover attempt.

Porcupine Provisions : Corporate charter of bylaw provisions intended to thwart
takeover attempts.

Radar Alert: Close monitoring of stock-market activity to determine if an outside party
is accumulating stock for a hostile-takeover attempt.

Raider : A hostile outside party seeking to take control of a company.

Recapitalization : The radical alteration of the capital structure, such as the payment of a
large cash dividend to shareholders, to make the target company less attractive.

Reverse LBO : An initial public offering by a company which was previously acquired in
a leveraged buyout.

Saturday Night Special: A seven day cash tender offer for a company's stock. It usually
begins on a Saturday so the target company has difficulty reaching its key
advisers.

Scorched-Earth Defense : Tactic by the target to discourage acquirers by selling its assets,
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making it unattractive, visions in the firm's charter to discourage a takeover (such as
poison pill).

Showstopper : Litigation designed to stop a hostile takeover attempt.

Sleeping Beauty : A takeover target.
Stock Swap : An acquirer offers a majority stake or a remaining interest of a
portion of its public or private stock, rather than cash, as the principal consideration for
the target company's stock.

Sweeping Purchase : An acquirer makes stake purchases of all available shares with the
intention of gaining control.

Takeover : The acquisition of one company by another.

Tender Offer : An offer (made directly to the shareholders) to purchase part or all of a
company's outstanding stock.

Tidal-Wave Purchase : A raider's open-market purchase of a company's stock in a short
time period (the target company is overwhelmed).

Tin Parachute : Termination benefits for all employees in the event they lose their jobs
following a takeover.

White Knight: A friendly firm or person who saves the company from a hostile takeover
by taking it over.

White Squire : Attempts made by the target company to thwart an unsolicited or hostile
bid by selling a block (less than a majority) of shares (usually convertible

preferred with special voting rights) to a friendly third party.
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